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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NATURAL LAW
DAVID C. BAYNE, S.J.
IN this day when the natural law is so much talked of and so often
endorsed and yet so rarely understood, every reader is searching
vainly for its true essence and nature. Yet if the natural law has any
weakness, and it has, that weakness is that everything about it cannot
be said all at once. It is a philosophy of life, of law, of conduct and of
living, not a phrase, nor a simple theory, nor a theorem that can be
pulled out and applied to a problem for an automatic solution.
As with the natural law itself, this essay cannot say everything at
once. But that does not mean that it should not say something. In the
light of all these difficulties with the natural law, however, there is one
thing that should be made clear from the outset: what this essay is not
trying to say, or do. By doing this, the reader will not turn away, again
dissatisfied with the natural law, having come seeking, and departed
untaught.
This essay will not: (i) Lay the philosophical foundations of the
natural law, will not elucidate the fundamental Thomistic' and Suare-
zian 2 concepts of the natural law. They should be studied, but not here.
Such a study' is nothing other than a compendium of philosophy, an
ordered study of metaphysics, epistemology, psychology especially,
natural theology and above all ethics, all rolled into one treatise and
denominated "natural law." (z) Make the natural law live for the
reader by applying it detail-by-detail to a given moral or legal prob-
lem, beginning from the facts and tracing the reasoning through from
the most ultimate principles of the natural law, on down through the
more proximate, to the final solution. That is also for a separate article,
and a valuable one. (3) Analyze the natural law philosophy of the
Supreme Court, case-by-case, justice-by-justice, 4 Court-by-Court.
I Aquinas, Summa Theologica, translated by Anton C. Pegis 2, 743 (1945).
2 Suarez, De Legibus, translated by Williams, Brown and Waldron with revisions by
H. Davis, in the Classics of International Law: Selections from Three Works of
Francisco Suarez (1944).
3 For an excellent short treatment, see Rommen, The Natural Law (1948).
4 For an example, see Obering, The Philosophy of Law of James Wilson.
MR. BAYNE received his LL.M. at Georgetown University and is a member of the
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That is a study for the future. (4) Determine what the Court really
meant (and equally important, what it should mean) when it used the
words "natural law." That, too, is a necessary study, but not for here.
What then will this essay attempt? It will be a survey, 5 of a necessity
due to space a superficial one, of the tradition of natural law thinking
in the history of the Supreme Court of the United States, from its
earliest inception up to the present Court. What purpose will such a
general survey serve? It will show that natural law reasoning, of some
kind at least, has had a place in our American judicial tradition. It
might, further and more important, excite some interest, and even
prompt a study of the other phases of the natural law which are not
going to be treated here, and yet which are so necessary in this world of
ours, slipping as it is on the shifting sands of relativism, pragmatism and
legal realism.
Over two decades before the beginning of the Supreme Court of the
United States, in the year 1764, James Otis expressed the fact that all
laws and government have "an everlasting foundation in the unchange-
able will of God, the Author of nature, whose laws never vary," and
that "there can be no prescriptions old enough to supersede the law of
nature and the grant of Almighty God, who has given to all men a nat-
ural right to be free."'
James Otis began a long series of enunciations of a similar kind that
were expressive of the tradition of natural law thinking that so charac-
terized the entire governmental philosophy of the United States from
its conception.
In July of 1776, the thirteen United States spoke of "the laws of
nature and of nature's God" in the Declaration of Independence, and
went on to say:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights; that among
these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
These words indicate the mind of our first fathers and "formulate a
general political philosophy-a philosophy upon which the case of the
colonies could solidly rest."7
5 For helpful collateral studies, see Corwin, The Debt of American Constitutional
Law to Natural Law Concepts, 25 Notre Dame Lawyer 258 (1950); Haines, The Law
of Nature in State and Federal judicial Decisions, z Yale L. 617 (x916).
ts Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved (1764).
7 Becker, The Declaration of Independence, A Study in the History of Political
Ideas 8 (94z).
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But it is not the place here to trace the historical development of the
natural law itself," nor does it devolve on this essay to consider the
early American tradition of the natural law in all its broader relations
to government and political science.' We are concerned with the tradi-
tion of natural law principles in the judiciary of the United States.
The Age of Marshall
There is one prominent figure in these earliest days before Marshall
actually ascended the bench who looms higher than the others, both as
a justice and as an exponent of the natural law. He is Justice James
Wilson. The work of Wilson was voluminous, exactingly accurate
and very trustworthy. Perhaps not another justice in the history of
the Court could be compared with him as a throughgoing, and cor-
rect, natural law philosopher. His work and his philosophy have been
most comprehensively treated elsewhere. 10 His enunciations complete
the picture of the age of Marshall of which he could be called a
member."
Wilson12 left the bench in 1798 and closed the century and the early
part of the period. After Wilson, and for the next thirty-five years, the
American legal scene was dominated by a trio of great American
jurists, Marshall, Kent and Story. Thus, one commentator refers to
... the very important part played by the natural-law theory in the legal
writings and the court decisions of the times. In the opinions of men like
Marshall, Kent and Story, as well as in their formal treatises, the influence of
natural-law ideas is apparent.' 8
The work of Marshall and Story will comprise this first period in
our study.
FLETCHER V. PECK (I8io)1 4
"During the 181o term of the Court an important case was decided.
In fact, it ranks as one of the foremost constitutional pronouncements
8 Pollock, The History of the Law of Nature: A Preliminary Study, i Col. L. Rev.
ii (19oi).9 Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law, zo American Political Science
Review (1926).
10 Note 4 supra.
11 "His (Wilson's) conviction that jurisprudence is a science subordinated to ethics,
and that government, in the exercise of its powers, is subject to the moral law, meets
us on every page of his writings, and is enshrined in the one great judicial decision con-
nected with his name-the case of Chisholm, Executor v. Georgia (2 Dall. 419)."
Note 4 supra, at 19.
12 See James Wilson, Of the Law of Nature, from The Works of The Honorable
James Wilson (18o4).
13 Note 1o supra, at 535. 14 6 Cranch (U. S.) 87 (181o).
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of Chief Justice Marshall.""5 This case was Fletcher v. Peck. It was the
first case involving impairment of the obligation of contracts, and had
tremendous and immediate economic implications. It was regarded by
some as another skirmish in the Hamilton-Jefferson struggle. The facts
of the case and the numerous involved circumstances make its history
fascinating. For our purposes, however, Fletcher v. Peck is important
as a towering monument to the use of the natural law, a case which
carries in its wake hundreds of other cases 6 which rely on it wholly or
in part for authority. The case is of special value to our study as a
companion case to Ogden v. Saunders7 which comes at the latter end
of Marshall's life on the bench.
Fletcher v. Peck was the culminating point, from the legal or almost
any view, of the notorious and multi-millioned "Yazoo Frauds." In
1795 the entire state legislature of the state of Georgia was bribed-
with one lone exception-and the result was the legislative grant of
more than thirty-five million fertile and wooded acres to four land
companies. The price: less than a cent and a half an acre. The profits:
more than a million dollars the first day.
To the credit of Georgia, the populace was indignant. A new legis-
lature went in. Action was immediate. The original grant was rescinded
by a second act of the legislature. The old grant was even burned on
the statehouse steps. Meanwhile, speculators were not deterred in the
least. The land was passing from hand to hand. In short, the Rescinding
Act of the legislature was ignored on all sides.
Peck was a Boston owner of many acres of the disputed land.
Fletcher was a New Hampshire man to whom Peck deeded a small
share. The suit was a friendly one, and hence a test case, but it nonethe-
less represented a tremendous issue, and was by no means an impos-
ition on the Court, as some have felt moved to claim.
The suit was begun in the Circuit Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts, on diversity of citizenship, in an action of covenant brought
by Fletcher against Peck. It was averred that the covenant had been
breached since the Rescinding Act had rendered the conveyance of
Peck, as well as of Peck's grantors, void. The Circuit Court held that
15 Haines, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government and Politics
1789-1835, P. 309.
16 Some of the more outstanding and clearly traceable cases are: Satterlee v. Mat-
thewson, 2 Pet. (U.S.) 378 (18z9); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1884); Legal
Tender Cases, 12 Wall. (U.S.) 457 (1870); Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. Co. v.
Chicago, I66 U.S. 226 (1896).
17 iz Wheat. (U.S.) 213 (1827).
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the second act of the Georgia legislature had not impaired the tile.
The Supreme Court affirmed and made legal history.
Chief Justice Marshall wrote the majority opinion and moved immc-
diately to the heart of the case. Even though Georgia could be con-
sidered above and beyond submission to judicial tribunals for the pur-
pose of adjudication concerning the titles of the land passed by the
first act (and Marshall did not think the state should be so considered),
nevertheless there was still remaining the moral law to which it was
bound to subject itself. Thus he begins:
If the legislature of Georgia was not bound to submit its pretentions to those
rribunals which are established 'for the security of property, and to decide on
human rights, if it might claim to itself the power of judging in its own case, yet
there are certain great principles of justice, whose authority is universally ac-
knowledged, that ought not to be entirely disregarded.18
In short, whatever unwarranted arrogation of powers to itself the
legislature of Georgia may see fit to make, there always remain the
great precepts of natural justice, in short, the natural law, to hold it to
rectitude in whatever it does, even if it be a second act of legislation.
Marshall, here, prescinded completely from any consideration of courts
of law-that was his first hypothesis in the above quotation-and he
placed the matter wholly as one of personal conscience-that was his
second hypothesis-and still he held them to a law. And that law was
universal. Here we see reasoning that leads us to an Eternal Law of
God, universal in application, applicable at all times and places-in
court, or out of it.
Marshall next proceeds to suppose that the matter had been brought
before a court of equity (which was contrarily supposed above). What
would a court have done, if without a court the unsupported precepts
of justice had bound the legislature? Note well what Marshall says.
This is a perfect instance of the transit, implicit and veiled as it is, from
clearly natural law terminology to a terminology and phraseology that
gradually becomes a part of the Court's tradition, becomes hallowed by
constant usage until a sanctity grows up around a phrase which might
lead one to place the reason for the sanctity and the force of its binding
power in the phrase itself rather than in the natural law. So Marshall
supposes that a bill had been brought to set aside the conveyance by the
first act of the legislature. That court would have been bound by its
own rules, and by the clearest principles of equity, to leave unmolested
those who were purchasers, without notice, for a valuable considera-
18 Note 14 supra, at i33.
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tion.'9 Logically enough, Marshall holds a court of equity to the same
principles of justice to which he held the legislature when hypothetical-
ly it adjudged its own case outside the court.
Marshall gives us further explanation of his reasoning:
If the legislature felt itself absolved from those rules of property which are
common to all the citizens of the United States, and from those principles of
equity which are acknowledged in all our courts, its act is to be supportedby its
power alone .... 20
There is latent here a possible thrust at the "might-makes-right" phi-
losophy. It would seem, however, that he is merely reiterating his
former statement, that Georgia had taken the matter into her own
hands and had really no higher approval of her action than her own
word, which, in the light of the Eternal Law of God, will avail little if
the act done is in fact immoral.
The final word in the case is a very fit denouement to our study since
it clearly states the basis for the decision.
It may well be doubted, whether the nature of society and of government does
not prescribe some limits to the legislative power; and if any be prescribed,
where are they to be found, if the property of an individual, fairly and honestly
acquired, may be seized without compensation? .... The state of Georgia was
restrained, either by general principles which are common to our free institu-
tions, or by the particular provisions of the Constitution of the United
States .... 2'
We can well see from this how a later Court would be able to rely
on Fletcher v. Peck and these words of Marshall rather than be forced
to go beyond the precedents or the Constitution itself, since Marshall
here put some onus for the decision on the Constitution. This latter
attempt, however, appears to be "mere camouflage, designed to ...
sanction constitutional principle about to be announced. ' 22 Haines
has said:
But it is apparent, not only from the opinion itself, but also from Marshall's
political ideas and faith, that the argument predicated on general principles and
on implied limitations on legislative powers was the primary and fundamental
part of his opinion and that the reasoning founded on the constitutional inhibi-
tion was secondary. 23
Associate Justice Johnson wrote a dissent in part. It could better be
called a distinction, since he concurred with the other justices that a
state could not revoke its original grant. In the one point that he wanted
19 Note 14 supra, at 134. 20 Ibid. 21 Note 14 supra, at 135, 139.
22 Hagan, Fletcher v. Peck, 16 Geo. L. J. 1, 3 (1927).
23 Note 15 supra, at 319.
22 1
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made, Johnson is even more outspoken in his reliance on principles
higher than the Constitution than even Marshall himself. So he says:
I do not hesitate to declare, that a state does not possess the power of revok-
ing its own grants. But I do it on a general principle, on the reason and nature of
things; a principle which will impose laws even on the Deity. 24
Not only is Justice Johnson going to the first precepts25 of the nat-
ural law in seeking the foundation for his decision, but he is indicating
clearly the right of a people against arbitrary action by government.
Such a doctrine is completely repugnant to the positivist and totali-
tarian.
"ERRETT V. TAYLOR (1815)26
In the latter years of the Age of Marshall, the same adherence to the
fundamental principles of equity and justice as characterized by the
great chief justice was evident, and "the temper of the associate justices
was still substantially that of Marshall. '27
There can be no doubt that Justice Joseph Story was closer to Mar-
shall than any other man and more fit to carry on the tradition of
natural law thinking that had characterized the Supreme Court since
its inception.
Terrett v. Taylor, added to our series of outstanding natural law
decisions just five years after Fletcher v. Peck, was fully fitted to take
its place in the tradition.
Terrett v. Taylor involved circumstances very similar to those of
Fletcher v. Peck. In the lower court, the Circuit Court for the District
of Columbia, Taylor and others, members of the vestry of the Prot-
estant Episcopal Church of Alexandria in the District of Columbia,
filed their bill in chancery against Terrett and others, overseers of the
poor for the county. They prayed that the defendants be perpetually
enjoined from claiming the land of the church under the act of the state
of Virginia (where the land was situate before the separation of the
District of Columbia), which provided that, at the revolution, all the
property acquired by the Episcopal Churches became the property of
the state (due, ostensibly, to the loss of its character as the established
church), and that their title be quieted. The plaintiffs were granted
their prayer in the Circuit Court and the defendants sued out a writ of
24 Note 14 supra, at 143.
25 Ibid.
26 9Cranch (U.S.) 43 (8r5).
27 Hockett, The Constitutional History of-the United States 186-1876, p. 92 (1939).
SUPREME COURT AND THE NATURAL LAW
error. It is under these facts that the case came to Justice Story and the
Supreme Court of the United States.
The Supreme Court affirmed and agreed that the land belonged to
the Protestant Episcopal Church.
The court consisted of Marshall, Chief Justice, Washington, Livings-
ton, Duvall and Story. No dissent was voiced and Justice Story wrote
the majority opinion. Thus again we have the weight of both Marshall
and Story behind an expression of natural law reasoning.
Justice Story begins his reasoning with these words:
The title thereto was indefeasibly vested in the churches, or rather in their
legal agents. It was not in the power of the crown, to seize or assume it;... unless
by the exercise of a power the most arbitrary, oppressive and unjust, and endured
only because it could not be resisted.28
Story has referred his decision to a law, but it is not the law of any
temporal ruler or body of law. He explicitly denies the power to both.
This title to the lands was protected by a law superior to the crown, and
if the crown were to act in contravention of that law it was doing so
only because it could not be resisted. In short, if the crown so acted, it
based its action on force-on might alone-and was acting against the
Eternal Law of God, to which the crown is subject in all things. As he
continues, Story is more explicit in stating the foundation of his deci-
sion:
... the division of an empire creates no forfeiture of previously vested rights
of property. And this principle is... consonant with the common sense of man-
kind and the maxims of eternal justice.29
In Story's conclusion he summarizes his stand:
... we think ourselves standing upon the principles of natural justice, upon the
fundamental laws of every free government, upon the spirit and the letter of the
Constitution of the United States, and upon the decisions of most respectable
judicial tribunals, in resisting such a doctrine.30
OGDEN V. SAUNDERS (1827)31
Marshall and Story, in 1827, joined forces in one of the most impor-
tant cases which came to the Supreme Court during this period, Ogden
v. Saunders. Coming as it does as the finale to the period, it has the added
value for us in rounding out the Age of Marshall.
But Ogden v. Saunders was chosen for a greater purpose. It is able,
above all, to take us deep into the minds and philosophy of Marshall
28 Note 26 supra, at 49, 5o. 30 Note 26 supra, at 52.
29 Note 6 supra, at 5o. 31 12 Wheat. (U.S.) Z13 (1827).
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and men who thought with him. "It is only in the occasional case that
takes us back to fundamentals that Marshall's ... philosophy of law...
shows itself. For this, the most illuminating document is the dissenting
opinion in Ogden v. Saunders,...". 2 It is this same dissent that is later
embodied in the Constitution by amendment. 33
The facts of Ogden v. Saunders, in so far as they appertain to the
analysis of the obligation of contracts and to this study, are brief. It was
an action of assumpsit brought in the District Court of Louisiana by
Saunders against Ogden on certain bills of exchange drawn on Ogden,
accepted by him and protested for nonpayment. The defendant raised
as a defense a certificate of discharge under an act of the state legisla-
ture for the relief of insolvent debtors. The court rendered a judgment
for the plaintiff and the cause was brought by writ of error before the
Supreme Court of the United States. The single question for considera-
tion was whether the act of the state legislature was consistent with the
Constitution of the United States. The act in question was a bankruptcy
law, providing for the relief of insolvent debtors by discharging their
persons and future property from liability for their debts.
Marshall maintained that this act of the legislature could not be
resorted to as a bar to the action of assumpsit. The majority felt other-
wise. In Marshall's dissent concurred Justices Duvall and Story. Mar-
shall said:
... the idea of a pre-existing obligation on every man to do what he has
promised to do... exist anterior to, and independent of society, we may reason-
ably conclude, that those original ... principles are, like many other natural
rights, brought with man into society; and, although they may be controlled, are
not given by human legislation. 84
Marshall has laid down the general principles from the aspect of the
individual. But this is but the introduction. In the same paragraph Mar-
shall indicated another general principle. This viewed the situation
from the social aspect. Thus he says: "... they may be controlled," by
society. Here Marshall is indicating that all contracts have a twofold
aspect, individual and social; that man can never totally prescind from
the thought of the common good. Throughout this and the other cases,
therefore, the precept of social justice must be recognized as well, and a
32 Isaacs, John Marshall on Contracts 414.
33 "The Chief Justice, dissenting in Ogden v. Saunders, defended a doctrine favoring
the protection of vested rights, which, though not accepted by his Associates, was later
to be included in the broad scope given by interpretation of the phrase due process of
law as included in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." Note t5 supra, at 651.
3 Note 31 supra, at 345.
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proper balance between the individual and the common good be
achieved. These are very general considerations running through this
introductory word of Marshall.
Marshall then begins to elaborate his philosophy of the law of con-
tract. He begins his analysis by a discussion of the argument of the ad-
versaries:
... this argument... assumes that contract is the mere creature of society, and
derives all its obligation from human legislation. That it is not the stipulation an
individual makes which binds him, but some declaration of the supreme power
of a state to which he belongs.... That though this original declaration may be
lost in remote antiquity, it must be presumed as the origin of the obligation of
contracts. This postulate the defendants deny, and, we think, with great reason.8 5
Marshall takes this argument, shows its shallowness, and adduces his
own in contradistinction:
So far back as human research carries us, we find the judicial power...
applying these remedies, on the idea of a pre-existing obligation on every man
to do what he has promised on consideration to do; that the breach of this obliga-
tion is an injury for which the injured party has a just claim to compensation,
and that society ought to afford him a remedy for that injury... we find no
allusion, from the earliest time, to any supposed act of the governing power
giving obligation to contracts. On the contrary, the proceedings respecting
them of which we know anything, evince the idea of a pre-existing intrinsic
obligation which human law enforces. 36
Implicit in his whole treatment is the essential equality of the persons
contracting, the independence of their respective human persons, the
dignity of man as juridically and morally free to follow his ends, with
the only provision that he act rightfully. Here Marshall is recognizing
that man exists for the prosecution of his own personal ends, that man
must be protected in the natural means to these ends, among which is
the right to contract. It is true that he does not argue here from the
metaphysical concept of the human person, but his constant reference
to an obligation that pre-exists, which only is enforced, not made, by
human law leads us to all the notions that would be expressed in such
an approach.
Marshall is forced by the consequences of his words to admit that
God, as the Author of nature, so created the human person that man of
his own will and disposition and natural inclination tended first to enter
society, then to own his own and finally, and fully as naturally, to dis-
pose of his own in the attainment of his ends by means of contract.
Consequent on this contract, and flowing from the nature of man as
35 Note 3 1 supra, at 344. 36 Note 3 1 supra, at 344, 345 .
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made by God, man must be held obliged to fufill his part of the bargain.
As soon as Marshall goes beyond the positive law enactments of society
for his sanction for contracts he is faced with these considerations. It is
God's Eternal Law in the nature of man that is the ultimate font of
obligation.
He continues, this time excluding the possibility of "might-makes-
right."
The rightfulness of coercion must depend on the pre-existing obligation to do
that for which compulsion is used. It is no objection to the principle, that the
injured party may be the weakest. In society, the wrong-doer may be too power-
ful for the law. He may deride its coercive power, yet his contracts are obliga-
tory; and if society acquire the power of coercion, that power will be applied,
without previously enacting that his contract is obligatory.3 7
The added note of sanction and obedience to just authority is intro-
duced here. Again, as he did so often previously, Marshall condemns
brute force as the norm of morality.
Next Marshall treats of the natural law right to property and the
consensual aspect of contract:
... that obligation... is conferred by the act of the parties. This results from
the right which every man retains, to acquire property, to dispose of that prop-
erty .... These rights are not given by society, but are brought into it.88
In this statement we see the derivation of the right to contract from
the right to private property. Here, too, is the indication that the proxi-
mate cause of the binding force of the contractual obligation is the con-
sent of the parties. Consent must always be present. It is only by con-
sent that the juridically and morally independent persons can signify
their intent to so contract and to call into force the binding power that
is theirs to exert as human persons. Marshall continues:
... we must suppose, that the framers of our Constitution were intimately ac-
quainted with the writings of those wise and learned men, whose treatises on the
laws of nature and nations have guided public opinion on the subjects of obliga-
tion and contract. When we turn to those treatises, we find them to concur
in the declaration, that contracts possess an original intrinsic obligation, derived
from the acts of free agents, and not given by government. We must suppose,
that the framers of our Constitution took the same view of the subject, and the
language they have used confirm this opinion s 9
Transition
There has been a tendency among some of the modern commenta-
tors on the work of the Supreme Court to minimize the influence of the
3' Note 31 supra, at 345, 346.
qs Note 31 supra, at 346. 39Note 31 supra, at 353, 354.
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natural law during the transitional years from the close of the age of
Marshall in 1835 to the outstanding pronouncements of Field, Harlan,
and Brewer beginning in 1870.40 These thirty-five years were not as
expressive of natural law reasoning as those preceding or following, but
it would seem that another evaluation is the correct one. From 18 30 un-
til the Civil War the Court hardly needed to do more than apply the
canons of constitutionalism already laid down.41
There is sufficient evidence 42 that the tradition of the Court had not
been lost and the continuity of natural law reasoning had been main-
tained. Chief Justice Taney and Justice Daniel were outstanding in this
period.
HARRIS V. HARDEMAN (1852 )
43
Harris v. Hardeman involved a judgment of a court rendered with-
out service of process on the defendant or his appearance before the
court. Harris instituted in the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Southern District of Mississippi an action on a promissory note against
Hardeman, and on a writ sued out in that action, the marshall made a
return in these words: "Executed on the defendant Hardeman, by
leaving a true copy at his residence." On this return, at the next term of
the court, a judgment by default was taken against the defendant
Hardeman for the amount of the note, and an execution was issued
upon which a forthcoming bond was given. The defendant in error
moved the Circuit Court to quash this forthcoming bond, executed by
the defendant to the plaintiff, and to set aside the judgment on which
the bond was founded, upon the grounds that the forthcoming bond
was taken in execution of a judgment entered by default, when in
truth there had been no service of original or mesne process on him to
warrant such a judgment.
The Circuit Court of Mississippi quashed the proceedings and set
aside the judgment by default. The Supreme Court affirmed, and Jus-
tice Daniel delivered the opinion of the court, saying:
40 Haines, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts 173, 174 (1930).
41 Laski, The State in Theory and Practice 156 (1935).
42 Thus we hear in 1848, just thirteen years after Marshall: "But into all contracts...
there enter conditions which arise, not out of the literal terms of the contract itself.
They are superinduced by the pre-existing and higher authority of the laws of nature,
or nations, or of the community to which the parties belong. They are always pre-
sumed, and must be presumed, to be known and recognized by all, are binding upon
all ...... Justice Daniel in West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. (U.S.) 532 (1848). For
an excellent case at the other end of this period, in 1867, see Cummings v. Missouri,
4 Wall. (U.S.) 277 (1866).
43 '1 How. (U.S.) 333 (1852).
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We have refused to sustain an action here upon a judgment.., where.., no
personal summons or actual notice was given.... In such cases we have con-
sidered ... the judgment having no force in personam. This principle is not con-
sidered as growing out of anything peculiar to proceedings by attachment, but
is founded on more enlarged and general principles. 44
Here we find Justice Daniel going beyond and behind the ordinary
positive law prescriptions concerning notice and appearance, and ap-
peals to principles of "natural justice," which is to say, principles of the
natural law.
Mr. Justice Daniel concludes his opinion in unmistakable language:
"This doctrine does not depend merely upon adjudged cases; it has a
better foundation; it rests upon a principle of natural justice."4
An analysis of the Court's reasoning here will show the regard for
the equality of all human persons and the equal rights of all before the
law. This results in the equal right to each to proper notice of trial,
without which inequality results and hence injustice. Further is the
judge's assent to the principle that no man may be held responsible for
acts or effects which were beyond his knowledge or notice. Without
notice there is no culpability, no responsibility. Even deeper in the
reasoning is the affirmance of the natural right to the means to existence,
the means to the ends of nature, the right to private property. This
reasoning joined with the open avowal that the doctrine of the case
rests on the better foundation of the principles of natural justice, places
Harris v. Hardeman on a high plane of natural law reasoning.
Field, Harlan and Bre'wer: The Late Ninetenth Century
As the country settled down after the years of turmoil ending with
the Civil War, there appeared a more marked return to the traditional
line of reasoning that had characterized the Court from the beginning.
This period produced the second great trio of American natural law
jurists: Field, Harlan and Brewer. These men were eminently worthy
to carry on the tradition of Marshall, Kent and Story, of Taney and
Daniel, and were responsible in the main for a further entrenchment of
natural law principles in the philosophy of the federal judiciary.
BUTCHER'S UNION CO. V. CRESCENT CITY CO. (1883)4'
Of this great trio, there seems no doubt that the foremost is Justice
Field. He was a highly creative man, and the nature of his intellect im-
pelled him on all occasions to go directly to fundamental and universal
46 111 U.S. 746 (1883).-44 Ibid., at 340 . 45 Ibid., at 341 .
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principles. Such a philosophy of law led him to oppose sharply any
governmental action that appeared arbitrary, 47 and evoked his remark-
ably pertinent pronouncement that the Fourteenth Amendment was
meant:
... to give practical effect to the declaration of 1776 of inalienable rights,
rights which are the gift of the Creator, which the law does not confer but only
recognizes.48
"The classic presentation of the theory of implied limitations" on
arbitrary acts of government "is that of Justice Field in Butcher's
Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., where he amplified his notions" on the
natural law basis for such limitations and gave posterity an excellent
ruling case on the point.4 9
The Butcher's Union case, like Fletcher v. Peck, carries in its wake a
long line of cases which depend on it for authority and has been, more-
over, very influential in the development of the constitutional notion
of freedom of contract.50
Just ten years earlier Justice Field had been with the minority on the
very same question in the Slaughter House Cases.51 Now his holding is
vindicated and the decision in the Slaughter House Cases overruled.
The facts in the Butcher's Union case center around the question of
a monopoly. An act of the General Assembly of the state of Louisiana
granted to the Crescent Company the sole right of landing and slaught-
ering stock in the city of New Orleans. On the basis of this grant, the
Crescent Company brought a suit in the Circuit Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana to obtain an injunction forbidding the Butcher's
Company from exercising the business of landing or butchering live-
stock within the prescribed limits named in the act of the Assembly.
The court granted an injunction. This is an appeal by the Butcher's
Union Co. from the Circuit Court.
The Supreme Court by Justice Miller reversed; there was no dissent.
It is the concurring opinion of Justice Field that is of main interest to
our discussion. Field begins this discussion with an analysis of the
fundamental principles of his decision.
47Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (188z).
48 See the dissent in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. (US.) 36, 1oS (1872).
49 Haines, The Law of Nature in State and Federal Judicial Decisions 632.
50 For a full treatment of the influence of this case in the growth of the constitutional
notion of liberty of contract see Anthony, Attitude of the Supreme Court Toward
Liberty of Contract, 6 Tex. L. Rev. 266 (1928); Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 Yale
L. J. 4 54 (19o9).
51 Note 48 supra.
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As in our intercourse with our fellow-men certain principles of morality are
assumed to exist, without which society would be impossible, so certain inherent
rights lie at the foundation of all [governmental] action, and upon a recognition
of them alone can free institutions be maintained. These inherent rights have
never been more happily expressed than in the Dclaration of Independence, that
new evangel of liberty to the people: 'We hold these truths to be self-evident'-
that is so plain that their truth is recognized upon their mere statement-'that all
men are endowed'-not by edicts of emperors, or decrees of Parliament, or Acts
of Congress, but 'by their Creator with certain unalienable rights'-that is, rights
which cannot be bartered away, or given away, or taken away except inpunish-
inent of crime-'and that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness, and to secure these'-not grant them but secure them-'governments are in-
stituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the gov-
erncd.' 52
Field stresses the supra-governmental nature of these "inherent
rights." They lie at the base of all law. He emphasizes their pre-exist-
ence. They are not granted by human legislation, but secured. It is
recognition of them, not creation, that maintains free institutions. It is
another aspect of this same point that Field reiterates when he attributes
the origin of these rights, not to man, but to the Creator of men. Again
he makes it clear that these rights and laws are above and beyond man.
They have their source, their authority from the absolute law of God,
the Eternal Wisdom. It is not within the power of man to alter these
laws, to tamper with these rights, neither give them away, nor barter
them, nor take them from another.53
The basic nature of these first principles is also evident from Field's
reference to them as "assumed to exist," and "so plain that their truth is
recognized upon their mere statement ... "
Field indicates the true purpose of human government-to secure
these fundamental principles of right. Clear from this is the subordina-
tion of government to right reason. Government is the means to the
end of right order, not the end to which the human person is subordi-
nated and enslaved. The state is the servant of the citizen, the con-
server of his rights. The citizen is not the slave of the state, the pawn of
the race or the nation. Field indicates these basic principles as a prelude
to a discussion of the less general right to personal freedom on which he
immediately bases his decision.
52Note 46 supra, at 756, 757. It is necessary to note that the decision was handed
down on the ground that the legislative act granting the monopoly was a limitation of
the state's police power to the prejudice of the general welfare in health and morals.
53Field errs in his statement: "... except in punishment of crime," because there are
some rights which are inalienable even in punishment of crime. We have no reason to
suppose Field was ignorant of them; he merely made the general statement and failed
to distinguish such rights as the freedom of conscience, of faith, and the like.
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Throughout this article we have stressed man's right and duty to
self-perfection. Field has this in mind as he continues:
The common business and callings of life, the ordinary trades and pursuits,
which are innocuous in themselves, and have been followed in all communities
from time immemorial, must, therefore, be free in this country to all alike upon
the same conditions. The right to pursue them.... is a distinguishing privilege
of citizens of the United States, and an essential element of that freedom which
they claim as their birthright.54
Man has the right to follow any vocation not inconsistent with the
rights of others which will permit him to provide the necessities of life
for himself and his dependents. This includes the right of full develop-
ment of each man's faculties.
Field narrows this down to the specific application in the Butcher's
Union case.
In this country it has seldom been held, and never in so odious a form as is
here claimed, that an entire trade and business could be taken from citizens and
vested in a single corporation. Such legislation has been regarded everywhere
else as inconsistent with civil liberty. That exists only where every individual has
the power to pursue his own happiness according to his own views, unrestrained,
except by equal, just, and impartial laws.... I cannot believe that what is termed
in the Declaration of Independence a God-given and an inalienable right can be
thus ruthlessly taken from the citizen .... u
And with that, Field declares the act creating the monopoly void.
Field here indicates his appreciation of the dignity and freedom of the
human person. This person is free and unrestrained, except by just
laws. There is the proper balance between this independence of man as
an individual entity and his dependence on the law of the Creator as a
dependent and created being.
MONONGAHELA NAVIGATION CO. V. UNITED STATES (1893)0
In every respect David Josiah Brewer was as powerful an advocate
of natural law principles as any man of his age. A suitable reflection
of this philosophy and of this period is the Monongahela Navigation
case.
The Monongahela Navigation Company had, under the authority
of the state of Pennsylvania, expended large sums of money in improv-
ing the Monongahela River by means of locks and dams. Considerable
additional commerce on the Monongahela River was made possible by
these improvements. After the effort on the part of the United States
54Note 46 supra, at 757.
55Note 46 supra, at 757, 758. 56 148 U.S. 392 (1893).
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to purchase this lock and dam had failed, proceedings of condemnation
were instituted in the Circuit Court of the United States for the West-
ern District of Pennsylvania. The case was appealed not on the matter
of condemnation, but of compensation due. Mr. Justice Brewer de-
livered the opinion of the court reversing and remanding the case.
There were no dissents.
Brewer proceeds to discuss the twin rights (i) of the state to take
private property for public use and (z) the citizen to demand just
compensation. He says in the words of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey:
... this power to take private property reaches back of all constitutional pro-
visions; and it seems to have been considered a settled principle of universal law
that the right to compensation is an incident to the exercise of that power; that
the one is so inseparably connected with the other, that they may be said to exist
not as separate and distinct principles, but as parts of one and the same prin-
ciple.57
Here Brewer has reference to the principles of commutative justice:
each must give to each his due.
As further substantiation, Justice Brewer cites Chancellor Kent
speaking for the Supreme Court of New York. In that pronouncement
Kent, having noted that there was no provision in the Constitution of
New York on the subject, concluded that it was a principle of natural
equity, recognized by all temperate and civilized governments, from
a deep and universal sense of its justice, that fair compensation should
be made to a person deprived of his property for the common use.
Thereupon Brewer adds in his own words that "in this there is a natural
equity which commends it to everyone. '' Ss
Just before discussing the lengthy details of the manner of arriving
at a just compensation, Brewer closes his pronouncement on the gen-
eral subject of compensation in these words:
The right of the legislature of the state, by law, to apply the property of the
citizen to the public use, and then to constitute itself the judge in its own case,
to determine what is the 'just compensation' it ought to pay therefore, or how
much benefit it has conferred on the citizen by thus taking his property without
his consent, or to extinguish any part of such 'compensation' by prospective
conjectural advantage, or in any manner to interfere... cannot for a moment be
admitted or tolerated under our Constitution. If anything can be clear and un-
deniable, upon principles of natural justice or constitutional law, it seems that
this must be so.59
57 Ibid., at 324, 325.
58 Ibid., at 325.
59 Ibid., at 327, 328.
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The opinion of the court in the Monongahela Navigation case pre-
sents an example of the transition from the earlier and avowedly nat-
ural law cases to the later disavowedly, though truly natural law deci-
sions. We have heard the numerous references to the principles of "ab-
solute and eternal justice" of Mr. Justice Brewer. Now we hear him
make his nexus by stating that there is no need to rely on these princi-
ples in themselves; that actually the Constitution of the United States
is capable itself of providing sufficient authority for the decision
handed down in the Monongahela Navigation case.
But we need not have recourse to this natural equity, nor is it necessary to look
through the Constitution to its affirmations lying behind it in the Declaration of
Independence, for, in this Fifth Amendment, there is stated the exact limitation
on the power of the government to take private property for public uses.60
The development of natural law reasoning and its insertion into the
spirit and substance of the Constitution is not always as apparent as it
is in this opinion of Justice Brewer. As time goes on it will be increas-
ingly difficult to point to the underlying philosophy. The cliche and
standard phrase will take over the onus of thinking and push the reason-
ing underlying the decision to the background.
CHICAGO, BURLINGTON AND QUINCY R.R. CO.
V. CHICAGO (1897)61
John Marshall Harlan was worthy of his name. Almost a century
after his illustrious namesake he carried on the same tradition in his ad-
herence to the basic principles of the natural law. He was a "militant
justice,"6' 2 and since he was "inclined to emphasize the theory of nat-
ural rights, he was readily disposed to adopt the doctrine of funda-
mental rights which the Justices of the Supreme Court were slowly de-
veloping in connection with the interpretation of the due process
clause."s
The Circuit Court of Cook County in Illinois handed down a judg-
ment awarding the sum of $ 1.oo to the plaintiff in error, the Burlington
Railroad. This sum was held to be the just compensation for the taking
of a part of its right of way under eminent domain. The Supreme
Court of Illinois affirmed and the case was brought on writ of error to
the Supreme Court of the United States. The facts further indicate that
60 Ibid., at 325. 61 166 US. zz6 (1897).
62 Clark, The Constitutional Doctrines of Justice Harlan, 33 Johns Hopkins Univ.
Studies 4 (1915).
63 Haines, the Revival of Natural Law Concepts zoo (1930).
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there was no interference with the Burlington's right of way; that the
only change was in the laying of the street where formerly there was
merely gravel and cinders. The Supreme Court affirmed the state court.
Justice Brewer dissented in a part irrelevant to this discussion. Jus-
tice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court.
Justice Harlan begins his discussion by remarking that the mere fact
of notice and appearance does not in itself constitute "due process of
law" and mean that all the requirements contained in that phrase have
been satisfied. He goes on to point out that there are other requirements
to be satisfied. "In determining what is due process of law regard must
be had to substance, not to form. 6 4
The question then arises whether due process of law enjoined in the
Fourteenth Amendment requires compensation to be made to the
owner of private property divested of that property for the public
good. This is the general question that occupies Harlan in this case. He
treats it in view of the broad principles of natural equity.
The requirement that the property shall not be taken for public use withoutjust compensation is but 'an affirmance of a great doctrine established by the
common law for the protection of a private property. It is founded on natural
equity, and is laid down as a principle of universal law. Indeed ... almost all
other rights would become worthless if the government possessed an uncontrol-
lable power over the private fortune of every citizen.'65
Harlan shows here the same respect for the primary precepts of the
natural law of commutative justice and of private property. He recog-
nizes the dignity of the person, the inviolability of the citizen, and at
the same time acknowledges the authority of the duly authorized state
in matters of the common good.
Justice Harlan concludes with a reiteration of the God-given and
God-ordaining quality of the law behind the positive law. It is the idea
again of the Eternal Law.
... it was held to be a settled principle of universal law, reaching back of all
constitutional provisions, that the right to compensation was an incident to the
exercise of the power of eminent domain; that the one was so inseparably con-
nected with the other that they may be said to exist, not as separate and distinct
principles, but as parts of one and the same principle; and that the legislature
'can no more take private property for public use without just compensation
than if this restraining principle were incorporated into and made part of its
state constitution.' 66
The First Half of the Twentieth Century
The period beginning at the turn of the century can best be charac-
terized as one of wane in the use of natural law principles. This is prob-
64Note 61 supra, at 235. 65Notc 61 supra, at 236. 66Note 61 supra, at 238.
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ably due in the main to the coming to the bench of men of the stamp of
Holmes. But it will be to commentators of fifty years hence to evaluate
properly the period.
LOCHNER V. NEW YORK (1905);67 ADAIR V. UNITED STATES (I9o8). 68
AND COPPAGE V. KANSAS (1915)6'
The early years of this period, however, do not seem to presage this
wane. In the first two decades we find those principles of government
that have "an everlasting foundation in the unchangeable will of God,
the Author of nature, whose laws never vary," and the "law of nature"
expressed "in a famous trilogy of decisions of the Supreme Court."74'
Speaking of these famous three cases, one commentator observes:
The protection of the inalienable right of liberty of contract was taken up
vigorously by the state courts .... the protection in the Supreme Court culmi-
nated in the decisions of Lockner v. New York, Adair v. United States, and
Coppage v. Kansas and led to the affirmation of the dictum of Justice Harlan that
,the employer and employee have equality of right, and any legislation that dis-
turbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract,
which no government can legally justify in a free land.' 71
Limitations of time and space make a detailed analysis of these
opinions impossibile. They, and other cases early in the century, carry
our tradition up to the Blaisdell opinion in 1934.
HOME BUILDING AND LOAN ASSN. V. BLAISDELL (1934)72
The facts of the Blaisdell case center around the constitutionality of
an act of the legislature of Minnesota granting special relief, through
authorized judicial proceedings, with respect to foreclosures of mort-
gages during the declared emergency period. The Supreme Court of
Minnesota declared the act to be an emergency measure consonant
with the powers of the legislature and refused to render it void as un-
constitutional. The case came on appeal from that court. The Supreme
Court of the United States found that the state court had applied the
general principles well, and that the act of the legislaure did not violate
the constitution.
The court consisted of Chief Justice Hughes, Justices Van Devanter,
McReynolds, Brandeis, Sutherland, Butler, Stone, Roberts, and Car-
dozo. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes delivered the opinion of the
court. Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds and Butler concurred in
the dissent of Justice Sutherland.
67 z98 U.S. 45 (1905). 7°Note 9 supra, at 324.
68 208 U.S. 161 (19o8). 7 tNote 49 supra, at 646.
69 z36 U.S. i (15). 72 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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The Court's first pronouncement was that the measure was definitely
a relief one; that it was designed only for the drastic financial situation
of the 1929 depression. It is significant, however, that in the reference
to emergency, specifically war emergency, it remarked that "even the
war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding
essential liberties.
7 8
There is no denunciation by the Court of the principles of owner-
ship, of the right of contract, of the sacredness of contract. This was
simply an instance where the interests of the group, the common good,
demanded some modification of the contract of mortgage. The unusual
nature of the depression of 1929 rendered it the duty of the state in the
interest of the general welfare to exercise its emergency power in re-
lief from foreclosures. The Court gives an excellent presentation of
its stand in the following statement:
But into all contracts .... there enter conditions which arise not out of the
literal terms of the contract itself; the), are superinduced by the pre-existing and
higher authority of the laws of nature, of nations or of the community to which
the parties belong; they are always presumed, and must be presumed, to be
known and recognized by all, are binding upon all, and need never, therefore, be
carried into express stipulation, for this could add nothing to their force. Every
contract is made in subordination to them, and must yield to their control, as
conditions inherent and paramount, wherever a necessity for their execution
shall occur.74
Certainly the Court's words concerning the common good in re-
lation to the individual are in line with basic philosophy of the true
state. The court understood that such impairment of the obligations of
contracts must be only in emergency periods and cease with the end of
the period.
Whatever we may say as to the advisability of regarding the instant
set of facts as emergency, however we may feel as to the application of
the general principles in this particular situation, we cannot fail to see
that the Court in the Blaisdell case argued the matter well and gave
proper consideration to the basic natural law principles involved.
The Court Today
With the advent of the Roosevelt Court it became increasingly diffi-
cult to ascertain, and hence predict, a pattern of Court thinking, to dis-
cern a clearly marked philosophy of law. This has continued to be true
under the Truman Court, if not to an even more notable degree. What
is true in regard to the law in general is a fortiori so in the matter of the
natural law. There is, moreover, an added factor militating against a
73 ibid., at 4z6. 74 Ibid., 2t 435, 436.
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reliable appraisal of the present Court. We are too close to the trees to
see the woods.
Looking over the years from the Blaisdell case to the present, a view
from the hilltop would seem to indicate that the Court has maintained
its tradition of the natural law, at least as it sees it-albeit with growing
difficulty and against greater odds. Thus, ten years after the Blaisdell
case, in 1943, the Court can be heard to clearly say in Buchalter v. New
York:
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that action by
a state through any of its agencies must be consistent with fundamental princi-
ples of liberty and justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institu-
tions, which not infrequently are designated as 'the law of the land.'75
Certainly the Court showed that it was mindful of its natural law
tradition in the Pal koT7 case, which figured prominently in Adamson v.
California. But for the clearest indication of the attitude of the Court
towards natural law philosophy we should look to this Adamson case,
and its companion, the Rochin case.
ADAMSON V. CALIFORNIA (1947) 77
Adamson was convicted of first degree murder by a jury. The
Supreme Court of California affirmed, and the case was taken to the
Supreme Court of the United States. The California Constitution per-
mits comment to jury and court on the failure of the accused to take
the stand. Adamson faced the choice of disclosure to the jury of prior
robbery and burglary offenses (in impeachment) or the harmful infer-
ences from uncontradicted evidence. Adamson chose not to testify.
The Court faced the question: Does the California law that permits
comment on the failure to testify violate the Fourteenth Amendment?
In answering this question in the negative, however, the Court stirred
up a sharp dispute over natural law and natural law principles and gave
us a view of its philosophy and reasoning that makes Adamson v. Cali-
fornia the chief and most outstanding norm of the present Court's stand
on the natural law. Prior to the consideration of the direct question of
the case, the Court debated at great length whether the rights (among
others, against self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment) contained
in the Bill of Rights of the first eight amendments were embodied in
globo in the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court answered categorically that the Fourteenth Amendment
7T Buchalter v. New York, 318 U.S. 766 (1942).
76Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
77 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
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did "... . not draw all the rights of the federal Bill of Rights under its
protection. '7 8 "Palko", it said, "held that such provisions of the Bill of
Rights as were 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' became
secure from state interference.... ."' And Palko had relied on Twin-
ing0 in which the court said that a right is essential to due process only
when it is ".... a fundamental principle of liberty and justice which
inheres in the very idea of free government and is the inalienable right
of a citizen of such a government."81
It was at this point that the dispute broke out and the Court split over
the natural law. Justice Black wrote a strong dissent, joined by Justice
Douglas, seeing in the case ".... a decision which reaches far beyond
the relatively narrow issues on which this case might have turned. '8 2
This narrow issue of Justice Black was: Did the Fourteenth Amend-
ment ".... make the prohibition against the compelled testimony appli-
cable to trials in state courts? "' In answering in the negative the Court,
says Justice Black,
... reasserts a constitutional theory spelled out in Twining v. New Jersey, that
this court is endowed by the Constitution with boundless power under 'natural
law' periodically to expand and contract constitutional standards to conform to
the court's conception of what at a particular time constitutes 'civilized decency'
and 'fundamental liberty and justice. 8 4
Justice Black then makes it very clear what he, and presumably
Justice Douglas, think of the natural law, at least as they understand it.
But I would not reaffirm the Twining decision. I think that decision and the
,natural law' theory of the Constitution upon which it relies degrade the consti-
tutional safeguards of the Bill of Rights and simultaneously appropriate for this
Court a broad power which we are not authorized by the Constitution to exer-
cise.8 5
Later he reiterates:
And I further contend that the 'natural law' formula which the Court uses to
reach its conclusion in this case should be abandoned as an incongruous excres-
cence on our Constitution. I believe that formula to be itself a violation of our
Constitution, in that it subtly conveys to courts, at the expense of legislatures,
ultimate power over public policies in fields where no specific provision of the
Constitution limits legislative power8s
There is good insight into Justice Black's fear of the natural law in
his later words:
78 Ibid., at 53. 79 Ibid., at 54.
SOTwining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
81 Ibid., at io6. 84Note 77 supra, at 69.
82 Note 77 5upra, at 69. 8 5Note 77 supra, at 70.
83Note 77 supra, at 68. 8 6Note 77 supra, at 75.
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Conceding the possibility that this Court is now wise enough to improve on
the Bill of Rights by substituting natural law concepts for the Bill of Rights, I
think the possibility is entirely too speculative to agree to take that course.87
This fear of entrusting the application of broad principles into the
hands of weak men rather than spell out closely worded directives is
merely the fear of all men of all times in placing the exercise of justice
in the hands of their fallible fellow men. Justice Black sees it as one
thing to interpret statutes according to standards enumerated specifi-
cally in the Bill of Rights, but ". . . to invalidate statutes because of
application of 'natural law' deemed to be above and undefined by the
Constitution is another.""8
Mr. Justice Murphy, with whom Justice Rutledge concurred, wrote
a separate dissent. Both were in substantial agreement with the views of
Mr. Justice Black, but they did not want to limit the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Bill of Rights. "Occasions may arise
where a proceeding falls so far short of conforming to fundamental
standards of procedure as to warrant constitutional condemnation in
terms of lack of due process despite the absence of a specific provision
in the Bill of Rights.""9 It might be asked whether Justices Murphy
and Rutledge did not want black and white at the same time. They
agree with Justice Black who would confine the interpretation of
statutes to the standards of the Bill of Rights, but they see occasions
where the norm must be "fundamental standards of procedure"-which
sounds perilously close to the "fundamental liberty and justice" con-
demned so heartily by Justice Black.
ROCHIN V. CALIFORNIA (1952)"
Rochin was convicted, without a jury, of possessing dope contrary
to California law. The chief evidence adduced was two capsules of
morphine extracted from accused invito by a stomach pump. The con-
viction was affirmed despite the finding that the officers were guilty of
unlawfully entering defendant's room and of assaulting, battering, tor-
turing and falsely imprisoning him.-The Supreme Court of California
denied Rochin's petition for a hearing. The Supreme Court of the
United States granted certiorari and reversed the decision below.
The Court faced the question: What limitations does the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment impose on the conduct of crimi-
nal proceedings by the states?
8 Note 77 supra, at 9o. 8 9Note 77 supra, at 1 24.
88Note 77 supra, at 91. 9072 S. Ct. 205 (1952).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote a very forceful opinion for the Court.
He strongly averred the power of the states to define crime and ad-
minister criminal justice, and claimed for the federal authority under
the due process clause only restrictions upon the manner in which the
states may enforce their penal code.
Justice Frankfurter saw a grave duty of the Court in applying the
due process clause and stated the norm of that application: Do the pro-
ceedings
... offend those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of
justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most
heinous offenses.9'
Throughout the opinion the court expresses well the broad concepts
of the norm of morality and the natural law imprinted in the heart of
man.
Due process of law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for
those personal immunities which, as Mr. Justice Cardozo twice wrote for the
Court, are 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental,' or are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'92
This identification of the natural law with the conscience of the
people is about the best short definition of the natural law possible.
But this does not mean that "The vague contours of the Due Process
Clause ...leave judges at large. We may not draw on our merely
personal and private notions and disregard the limits that bind judges in
their judicial function. Even though the concept of due process of law
is not final and fixed, these limits are derived from considerations...
deeply rooted in reason ...",8
At this point Justice Frankfurter, realizing that he has been expound-
ing natural law philosophy, remarks:
Due Process of law thus conceived is not to be derided as resort to a revival of
'natural law.' To believe that this judicial exercise of judgment could be avoided
by freezing 'due process of law' at some fixed stage of time or thought is to sug-
gest that the most important aspect of constitutional adjudication is a function
for inanimate machines and not for judges .... to achieve sufficient objectivity
no doubt demands of judges the habit of self-discipline and self-criticism....
But these.., are precisely the qualities society has a right to expect from those
entrusted with ultimate judicial power.94
The court thereupon applied these norms to the instant case and
concluded that
91 Ibid., at 208.
92 Ibid., at zoS.
98 Ibid., at zo8. 94 Ibid., at 2og.
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... the proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than
offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combat-
ting crime too energetically. It is conduct that shocks the conscience. 95
At this point Mr. Justice Black renews his opposition to the Court's
philosophy by a special concurrence in which he immediately refers to
his dissent in the Adamson case.
Harking back to all he had said of the natural law philosophy in that
case, Justice Black contemns again "the nebulous standards stated by
the majority," the "considerations deeply rooted in reason," "those
canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of
English-speaking peoples," the "traditions and conscience of our peo-
ple." In one word, Mr. Justice Black in 1952 feels exactly as he did
about the natural law in 1947. So does Mr. Justice Douglas.
Woven in and around the Adamson and Rocbin cases there are other
opinions of the court which reveal its philosophy. Certainly the Jersey
Scbool Bus 6 and the McCollum T opinions are not exactly consonant
with the natural law reasoning of the traditional expressions in Myers
v. Nebraska"s and Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 9 Above all is the dictum
of Chief Justice Vinson in Dennis v. United States abhorrent to the
natural law foundations of our nation:
Nothing is more certain in modem society than the principle that there are no
absolutes, that a name, a phrase, a standard has meaning only when associated
with the considerations which gave birth to the nomenclature. To those who
would paralyze our Government in the face of impending threat by encasing it
in a semantic straitjacket we must reply that all concepts are relative. 100
As Felix Morley put it in Barron's,
Our whole system of government is based on the assumption that there are
certain absolute values, referred to in the Declaration of Independence as 'the
Laws of Nature and of Nature's God.'... Our form of government is based
upon abstract ideas; is founded on a belief in natural rights. 1 1
Yet Justices Black and Douglas dissented in the Dennis case. So what
is to be said of the present court and natural law? It might come down
to this, that the problem is largely terminological. That if each justice
were to write out his philosophy of life, his concept of the role of God
95 Ibid., at 209.
96 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
97 McColum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
98 Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
99 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 51o (925).
00 341 U.S. 494, 5o8 (1951).
101 Morley, Barron's p. 3 (June 18, 1951).
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in our living and conduct, of the dignity of the human person, of his
rights, of his duties, of his God-given heritage, that if all this could be
written down, we might find a decent unanimity. It is to be doubted if
many would side with Justice Holmes in treating man (and hence his
nature which is his law) as a "baboon" or a "grain of sand. ''9 °2
Yet we must not be deluded. At best there is great need of much
study and education. At worst, there might be much of the materialism
of Holmes in the words of Vinson, of Black and of Douglas.
The crying need of the whole world today is for the stability and
security that comes from knowing where it is going and why, and that
is just another way of saying that the world needs a guide to lead it and
a goal to be led to. Certainly, as part of it, the law is no different from
the world. The goal for all, world and law, is God. The guide, too, is
the same for both, the directive norm of conduct that will surely lead
to God, the only goal.
From the standpoint of man as a spiritual animal destined for heaven,
and as a social and legal animal ordained to reach heaven by way of
earth, there is one absolute norm of conduct that God intended for
man as a guide through earth to heaven: the natural law.
lO2Holmcs, z Holmes-Pollock Letters 2S2 (1941).
